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ABSTRACT
We find an empirical regularity that stronger creditor protection reduces the volatility of stock market
prices. We analyze two distinct mechanisms that characterize equity price volatility: government
guarantees and creditor protection. Using a Tobin q model, we demonstrate that weak creditor
protection that gives rise to government guarantees and tightens credit constraints, increases stock
price  volatility.    Empirically,  accounting  for  the  probability  of  financial  crises,  we  find  that




















The paper addresses links between cross-country di®erences in institutional strength and macroeconomic
performance. Speci¯cally, we ask how creditor protection and government guarantees a®ect the volatility of
stock market prices.
A series of works have studied the impact of creditor protection on the ¯rm's external ¯nance availability.
La Porta et. al. (1997) examine a sample of 49 countries and ¯nd that countries with poor creditor protection
have, on average, smaller debt markets. Levine (2004) con¯rms these ¯ndings after including a variety of
additional control variables. Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2005) expand the external ¯nance volatility
analysis to 129 countries. Again, they ¯nd that creditor protection is associated with higher ratio of private
credit to GDP. Better creditor protection has also been shown to lower the ¯rm's borrowing cost. La Porta
et al. (2000) ¯nd that the cost of capital is higher, and the ¯rm valuation lower, in countries with weak
property rights. Bae and Goyal (2003) use data from 37 countries to examine how creditor rights a®ect loan
spreads (over the LIBOR or the prime rate) in international bank loans. They ¯nd that banks charge higher
loan spreads when property rights are weak.
Creditor protection a®ects also other aspects of the economy. Nenova et al. (2000) analyze more than
11,000 ¯rms in 46 countries and ¯nd that stronger creditor rights reduce the cash-°ow risk, operating income
variability, and the operating leverage. Galindo (2001) studies the impact of creditor rights on the credit
cycle. He ¯nds that creditor rights play an important role, by exacerbating credit risk in countries where
creditor rights are weakly protected, and hence inducing an over-reaction of credit markets to exogenous
shocks. Burger and Warnock (2004) examine foreign participation in 49 local bond markets, and ¯nd that
countries with strong creditor rights have on average more developed local bond markets, and they also rely
less on foreign-currency-denominated bonds. Moreover, more developed bond markets have a distribution of
returns characterized by high variance and negative skewness, factors eschewed by U.S. investors. Shleifer
(2003) further argues that for sovereign debt market to survive, the rights of creditors need to be protected
e®ectively.
However, most of these studies focus on the credit market and much less on the stock market. In this
paper, we try to ¯ll a gap by looking at how creditor rights and government guarantees a®ect the stock return
volatility for market aggregates. As a theoretical rationale behind the empirical link between institutional
features and asset price volatility, we analyze two distinct mechanisms. First, we consider government
2guarantees that lead to moral hazard. Such moral hazard may increase stock price volatility. Second, we
argue that creditor protection that may relax credit constraints is also associated with equity price volatility,
and the institutional weakness in the credit market exacerbates the volatility. There have been earlier studies
on how corporate control a®ects the dispersion of stock prices with a market. For example, Morck, Yeung
and Yu (2000) look at the stock price co-movement within a country. They ¯nd that co-movement is more
pronounced in poor economies than in rich economies, which they contribute to cross-country di®erences in
property rights. Our work is not concerned with the idiosyncratic dispersion of stock prices, but rather with
the instability in the aggregate. We expect that better creditor protection could reduce market volatility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines empirical regularities associated with the link
between creditor rights and stock market volatility. Section 3 analyzes two candidate mechanisms behind
the empirical regularities: government guarantees and institutional features which a®ect credit constraints.
Section 4 attempts to empirically separate these two mechanisms in the data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Regularities
2.1 Data
In this section, we look at the correlation between creditor rights, stock price volatility and credit growth
volatility . Our creditor protection index comes from La Porta, et al. (1998).1 The creditor rights index
ranges from 0 to 4 and is formed by adding one when the country imposes restrictions, such as creditor
consent or minimum dividends to ¯le for reorganization. In addition when secured creditors are able to gain
possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); secured
creditors are ranked ¯rst in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of
a bankrupt ¯rm; and the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of
the reorganization. Therefore, higher creditor rights index is associated with better protection for creditors.
In some analysis we also use the index of shareholder rights from La Porta et al. (2000). This index
ranges from zero to six and is formed by adding one when: the country allows shareholders to mail their
proxy vote to the ¯rm; shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders
Meeting; cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed;
1See http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/Data/l&fweb.xls
3an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a
shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample
median); shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders vote.
We also use the index for law and order from La Porta, et al. (1998), which ranges form zero to ten,
with higher number associated with better law implementation. Table 1 reports these three indexes for 20
countries in our sample. These indexes do not vary over time and are assessed as of early 1990s, close to the
beginning of our sample.
The data for stock market indexes come from Global Financial Data. We have monthly data (end of
month closes, as calculated by central banks, national statistical agencies, or stock exchanges themselves).
We study 20 developed and developing countries over the sample period from 1991 to 2000. The country
coverage includes emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand,
Singapore), as well as developed economies (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Japan,
New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US).
2.2 Creditor Rights and Stock Price Volatility
To measure the stock return volatility, we use the O±cer's method (O±cer (1973)). The O±cer method
estimates the stock return standard deviation for month 1 to month 12; next estimate the standard devia-
tion from month 2 to month 13; and then repeat the procedure, rolling the sample forward continuously. A
potential problem with O±cer's approach is that the use of overlapping observations will create a correlation
between standard deviations at di®erent points in time. An alternative is to use non{overlapping observa-
tions. That is, to compute the standard deviation using, say, months 1 through 12, 13 through 24, and so
forth. The problem is that this procedure results in relatively few data points. We tried both methods and
obtain similar results.
We estimate the equation:
ln(¾it) = ®0 + ®1Di + "it
where ¾it is the stock return standard deviation estimated from our O±cer's non-overlapping method,2 ®0 is
the constant term, and the vector Di includes the indexes for creditor protection and law and order. Owing
to data limitation, Di is however not time{varying.
2Thus we use only month 12 of each year.
4Table 2 demonstrates the link between credit protection and stock return variability. We can see that
better law and order and credit rights protection are associated with lower stock price volatility. We also
¯nd that the coe±cient of multiple correlation between these two indexes and the variance of the stock price
volatility is quite high. In the regression which excludes time ¯xed e®ects we obtain an R2 of 0.30.
2.3 Creditor Rights and Credit Growth Volatility
It is possible that creditor protection reduces stock volatility because it reduces the volatility of private
credit. In this subsection, we examine this explanation. We measure the annual standard deviation of the
private credit growth as in Schwert (1989). For most countries, we have only annual private credit estimates
for the period from 1980 to 2000. We therefore implement the following procedure:
First, we estimate a 2nd-order autoregression for the private credit growth rate mt, using all the annual
data available:
mt = k1 + Á1mt¡1 + Á2mt¡2 + ¹mt
where ¹mt is the disturbance term.
We then estimate a 2nd-order autoregression for the absolute values of the errors from the above regres-
sion,
j^ ¹mtj = ½0 + ½1 j^ ¹mt¡1j + ½2 j^ ¹mt¡2j + ³t
The ¯tted values, j~ ¹mtj, from this regression measure the conditional standard deviation of mt, given
information available before time t.
We then regress j~ ¹mtj onto the creditor protection index, as well as the law and order index :
ln(j^ ¹mtj) = ¯0 + ¯1Di + ´it
Results are presented in Table 3. We indeed ¯nd that both law and order and creditor protection are
associated with lower volatility of private credit. This time the R2 in the regression without time ¯xed e®ects
is lower than before, 0.23, but still respectable. Thus, it is indeed possible that law and order and creditor
protection a®ect stock market volatility only through credit volatility, a possibility we explore next.
52.4 Creditor Rights, Credit Growth Volatility and Stock Market Volatility
Finally, we estimate how the volatility of private credit a®ects stock return volatility. We follow Schwert
(1989) by estimating a regression equation of the form
ln(¾it) = ®0 + ®1Dit + ®2 ln(j^ ¹mtj) + "it:
Note that since j^ ¹mtj is a linear prediction based on j^ ¹mt¡1j and j^ ¹mt¡2j, the above equation is essentially
a regression of ln(¾it) onto j^ ¹mt¡1j and j^ ¹mt¡2j; which helps control for the potential endogeneity of credit
volatility.
The estimation results are presented in Table 4. We ¯nd that credit growth volatility is indeed positively
associated with stock price volatility. Moreover, creditor protection now is no longer signi¯cantly associated
with stock market volatility (the associated P-value is now 0.33). Thus we ¯nd that one potential channel
through which creditor protection may depress stock volatility is through reducing the volatility of private
credit.
3 Theory
We analyze two Tobin-q models that demonstrate potential links between creditor rights and government
guarantees and stock price volatility. We ¯rst present a model with government guarantees and we then
proceed to a model with an institutional mechanism.
3.1 Credit Guarantees
Consider a small open economy, producing a single aggregate tradable good. The production function for




3The model is based on Krugman (1998) and Frenkel and Razin (1996, Chapter 7).
6where At, 1¡½, and Kt denote the productivity level, the distributive share of capital, and the capital stock,
respectively. We assume that productivity levels follow a ¯rst-order autoregressive stochastic process:
ln(At+1) = ° ln(At) + "t+1 (2)
where "t+1 follows a uniform distribution over the region [¡1;1]. Using small letters to denote logs of cap
letters, we get
at+1 = °at + "t+1: (3)
Firms maximize the expected value of the discounted sum of pro¯ts subject to the available production
technology and to a cost-of-adjustment investment technology. According to the latter, gross investment












where It = Kt+1 ¡ Kt, and 1
v denote net capital formation (assuming zero depreciation) and a cost-of-
adjustment coe±cient, respectively. In the presence of costs of adjustment, gross investment typically exceeds
net capital formation, because of the additional costs of the reorganization and retraining associated with
the installation of new capital equipment.











t ¡ Zt + qt (Kt + It ¡ Kt+1)
´¸
; (5)
where the Lagrangian qt could be interpreted as Tobin's q.







Denoting ln(Kt) as kt and linearizing ln(À (qt ¡ 1) + 1) gives
kt+1 = kt + v (qt ¡ 1): (7)

















where Rt+1 is the capital rental rate. The optimal-investment rule in equation (8) implies that the cost of
investing an additional unit of capital in the current period must be equal to the expected present value
of the next period's marginal productivity of capital, plus the next period's induced fall in the adjustment
cost of investment resulting from the enlarged stock of capital, plus the continuation value in the capital
remaining for the entire future.
Note that from equation (1):
Rt+1 = (1 ¡ ½)At+1K
¡½
t+1: (9)
Linearizing ln(Rt+1), and denoting ¼ ´ 1 + ln(1 ¡ ½), yields:
Rt+1 = ¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + at+1: (10)






is relatively small compared with other two terms on the right
hand side of equation (8). Then equation (8) becomes
(1 + r)qt = Et [¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + at+1] + Et [qt+1]: (11)
3.1.1 Free Market Valuation of Q
Combining equations (7) and (11), we get:
qt =
(¼ + ½v ¡ ½kt + °at + Etqt+1)
1 + r + ½v
: (12)
We then solve qt by a \guess":
qt = B0 + B1at + B2kt: (13)
8From equations (7) and (13), we get
Etqt+1 = B0 + B1 (°at) + B2 (kt + v (qt ¡ 1)): (14)
Substituting equations (13) and (14) into equation (12), we solve B0, B1, B2 by comparing coe±cients














Now suppose that the government guarantees the investment if at+1 < g. That is, if at+1 < g, the net payo®
to the ¯rm will be
Net Payo® = 0: (16)
However, if at > g, the net payo® to the ¯rm will be
EtRt+1 + Etqt+1 ¡ (1 + r)qt: (17)
Then equation (11) becomes
(1 + r)qt (18)
= (1 + r)qt ¤ Pr(at+1 < g) + Et [¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + at+1 + qt+1 jat+1 > g] ¤ Pr(at+1 > g);
where Et [:jat+1 > g] is the expectation conditioned on at+1 > g. Combining equations (7) and (18) generates
qt =
¼ + ½À ¡ ½kt + Et [at+1 + qt+1jat+1 > g]
1 + r + ½À
: (19)
Suppose that government guarantee is proportional to the highest value of productivity level, i.e., gt+1 ´
4Note that the jumping variable qt is negatively related to the state variable kt.
9saH
t+1, where s 2 [0;1]. Then,5
E [at+1jat+1 > gt+1] =
(1 + s)(°at + 1)
2
: (20)















































Note that with more government guarantees s is larger, and B0
0 is also larger. Thus as expected govern-
ment guarantees raise the stock price qt.













= V art [B0
1"t+1]
A rise in s increases B0
1 and therefore causes larger stock return volatility for any given realization of
at+1. Since countries with better creditor protection tend to have smaller social demand for government
guarantees, better creditor protection could then lower stock return volatility.
5Note that conditioned on at, at+1 has a uniform distribution over [°at ¡ 1;°at + 1].
103.2 Creditor Protection and Credit-Constrained Investment
We now analyze an alternative Tobin Q mechanism that evolves around credit constraints.6
Assume that the ¯rm has to borrow from the creditor a durable input Wt, where Wt 2 [0;1]. At the
end of the period t, the ¯rm needs to return Wt. For simplicity, assume that the interest rate paid on the
durable input is zero. Then the ¯rm will borrow up to 1. However, there are some chances that the ¯rm is
not willing, or able, to return Wt, and the creditor has to go to a costly court procedure to claim back the
durable good Wt. Therefore, the creditor imposes an ex ante constraint on how much the ¯rm can borrow.
More speci¯cally,
Wt · min[!At;1]: (25)
The borrowed input is constrained by the ¯rm's productivity level At: as At decreases, the ¯rm will have
to borrow less. Finally, higher ! is associated with better creditor protection.7




Therefore, if Wt = !At , then Y = At!AtK
1¡½
t . However, if Wt = 1 , Y = AtK
1¡½
t .











t ¡ Zt + qt (Kt + It ¡ Kt+1)
´¸
: (27)
where the Lagrangian multiplier, qt, is interpreted again as Tobin Q.
Maximizing this Lagrangian will again gives us equations (7) and (8), although now the form for Et [Rt+1]
is di®erent. At time t, the ¯rm needs to take into account whether the constraint will be binding or not at
6See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Hart and Moore (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Mendoza (2005).
7In the literature on credit constraint and ¯nancial accelerator, the constraint tends to be based on a ¯rm's market value
qtkt. However, if both qt and kt are endogenous as in Mendoza (2005), then no tractable solution is available. By using At
rather than qt, we are able to provide tractable closed-form solutions.






= Et [¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + at+1 + ln(Wt+1)] (28)
= Et [¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + 2at+1 + ln! jWt+1 < 1] ¤ Pr(Wt+1 < 1)
+Et [¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + at+1jWt+1 = 1] ¤ Pr(Wt+1 = 1)
= ¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + °at ¡
1
4
(ln! + (°at ¡ 1))
2 :
Note that Et [¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + 2at+1 + ln! jWt < 1] is the expected Rt+1 when the constraint is binding, while
Et [¼ ¡ ½kt+1 + at+1jWt = 1] is the expected Rt+1 when the constraint is not binding. Combining equations
(7), (8) and (28) generates
q00
t =
¼ + ½v ¡ ½kt + °at ¡ 1
4 (ln! + (°at ¡ 1))
2 + Etqt+1
1 + r + ½v
: (29)
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3 by comparing coe±-
































12Note that as credit-constraint laxity coe±cient, !, rises, so does the market value of the ¯rm, qt; because
B00
0 is increasing in !.8
























As ! increases, B00






. Therefore, better creditor protection reduces
the price volatility. Note that as ! increases, B00
0 increases, so Tobin q00
t increases rather than decreases.
Having established two channels that connect institutional features to asset price volatility, we proceed
with empirical analysis of these channels.
4 Evidence
We now attempt to determine which of the two channels presented in the model (government guarantees or
credit constraints), if any, is responsible for the transmission of the creditor protection to the stock market
volatility. To do so, we ¯rst estimate a benchmark model of the stock price volatility to which we add, one
at a time (and also together), our proxies for the degree of government guarantees and tightness of credit
constraints.
4.1 Empirical Approach
In recent literature, ¯nancial crises are triggered not only by fundamental shocks, but also by the degree to
which market expectations about these fundamentals are coordinated. In the absence of common knowledge,
an individual market participant receives only an independent and noisy signal about the fundamentals
but also must have some uncertainty about the other market participants' expectations. Morris and Shin
(2000) show how the market participants' knowledge about the statistical distributions of the signals and
the market fundamentals (but not the actual realization of the fundamental and its idiosyncratic signals)
helps to coordinate the behavior of market participants. The coordination of expectations induces a unique
8Note that (1 ¡ ln$) is positive in the model. Therefore, as $ increases, (1 ¡ ln$)2 decreases.
13equilibrium in such a set up, in which there exists a unique threshold level of the fundamental.9
This recent theory of ¯nancial crises can guide us as to how to design our empirical approach. Financial
crises are cast in terms of self-ful¯lling expectation games. Self-ful¯lling expectations games played by market
participants have elements of a \beauty contest" (Allen, Morris and Shin, 2003). Market participants must
care not just about acting in the way that conforms with current fundamentals, but also about acting similarly
to the way other do. Institutional features determine the stochastic distribution of the fundamentals and the
e®ect of the market fundamentals on the performance of institutions. Thus, for example, deposit insurance
exerts not only a direct e®ect on stock return volatility, through the government guarantees mechanism, but
it could also have an indirect e®ect on the volatility, through its impact on the probability of ¯nancial crises.
That is, the deposit insurance can reduce the probability of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) and
thereby reduce the probability of ¯nancial crises.
We de¯ne ¯nancial crisis as an event of a big increase in the real interest rate of over 3 percentage points
in one year, which corresponds to highest 10% of annual changes in real interest rate in our sample. We also
de¯ne an alternative measure, to be used for the robustness tests, where crisis is de¯ned as an increase in the
real interest rate of over 7.1 percentage points in one year, or top 5% of annual real interest rate changes.
Table 5 presents a list of countries and years for which our ¯nancial crisis indicator is equal to 1 along with
the value our more strict indicator takes and the changes in real interest rate.






1 if yit > 0
0 if yit · 0
;
where y is a latent variable and a function of our independent variables:
yit = X0
it¯ + "it;
and " have either normal or logistic PDF. We also estimate linear probability model
I(crisis)it = X0
it¯ + "it:
9In a limiting case when the signal's residual approaches zero.
14We then construct a measure of the probability of ¯nancial crisis as a predicted value from the above
estimation, which we use in the analysis of stock market volatility. We ¯rst estimate a benchmark model
ln(¾it) = ®i + ° ¤ Pr(crisis)it + Z0
it± + !it;
where ln(¾it) is our measure of the stock market volatility, for December of each year; ®i is a set of country
¯xed e®ects, Zit is a set of control variables, errors !it are allowed to be serially correlated and heteroschedas-
tic. We use GLS in order to estimate this regression.
Given high level of autocorrelation in errors, we are concerned about the speci¯cation of our model. We
estimate, alternatively, the dynamic panel regression, using Arellano and Bond (1991) method:
ln(¾it) = ®1 ln(¾it¡1) + ®2 ln(¾it¡2) + ° ¤ Pr(crisis)it + Z0
it± + Àit;
where we specify the size of the stock market as exogenous and the probability of the crisis as predetermined
variables.
We then proceed by adding our proxies of government bailouts and credit constraints to see whether they
have an e®ect on stock market volatility.
Actual government bailouts are highly endogenous and crisis dependent, we are therefore more interested
in the potential government bailouts. To proxy for this we use an indicator of whether the country had an
explicit deposit insurance, ¯nanced by either government or private funds. We include deposit insurance
¯nanced by private funds, because in most cases these funds would themselves expect to be bailed{out by the
government. The data for the deposit insurance comes from the World Bank Deposit Insurance Database.
Credit constraints are notoriously di±cult to measure. At the aggregate level, we assume that the
availability of foreign ¯nancing for the country is highly correlated with aggregate availability of funds, since
domestic resources are limited by aggregate savings, which are usually not very volatile. In the spirit of
Klein, Peek and Rosengren (2002), we use country's sovereign rating from Standard & Poors as a proxy
for the country's aggregate credit constraint.10 When the sovereign rating is poor, government, banks and
non{¯nancial ¯rms ¯nd it expensive to borrow abroad and therefore compete for domestic resources. In the
countries with weak institutions, lending to the private sector would be squeezed ¯rst, leading to the credit
10We use numeric representation of the rating, with higher number corresponding to higher risk, i.e. worse rating.
15constraints.
Evidently, one cannot possibly account by institutional variables for all the cross{country di®erences that
would account for the variations in the stock market volatility between countries. Thus, we employ country
speci¯c ¯xed{e®ects regression analysis. Since our creditor rights measures do not vary over time, they drop
out from some stages of our analysis.
4.2 Results
We now report the results of the two stage estimation procedure: probability of crises and stock price
volatility.
4.2.1 Probability of Financial Crises
Table 6 shows our ¯rst stage estimation of the probability of ¯nancial crises. Since ¯xed e®ects Probit
regressions are not identi¯ed due to incidental parameters problem, we use pooled speci¯cation which also
allows us to include our measures of creditor rights protection. Since our proxies of government guarantees
and credit constraints might also a®ect the probability of ¯nancial crises, we include them in the regression
as well. Changes in banking system reserves and in commercial bank credit to the private sector (corrected
for in°ation) could also be indicative of the ¯nancial crisis. Finally, since the United States interest rates
tend to be transmitted to credit conditions in other countries, we include US 3-year Treasury rate.
As we would expect, better shareholder and creditor rights protection lowers the probability of ¯nancial
crisis, while sovereign credit risk increases the probability of crises. We expected deposit insurance to reduce
the probability of the crisis (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), and indeed we ¯nd that it has a stabilizing
e®ect. We also see that ¯nancial crises are more likely when domestic commercial banks decrease their
lending to private sector and increase their reserves. But we interpret these as feedbacks rather than causes
of ¯nancial crises, because we do not have available good instruments. Finally, as we would expect, ¯nancial
crises are more likely when US Treasury rate is high.
Since column (4) seems to provide the best ¯t, we use it to predict the probability of ¯nancial crisis to
be used in our second stage.
164.2.2 Stock Price Volatility
Benchmark results of the GLS estimation of our second stage regression are reported in column (1) of Table 7.
We can see that higher probability of ¯nancial crises increases the stock price volatility, while higher GDP
growth rate (which we lag by one year) lowers it.11 We also control for the size of the domestic stock market,
by including the (log of) number of ¯rms listed on the market. As expected, larger markets are less volatile
than thinner markets.
The predicted crisis probability is of course a function of our measures of deposit insurance and credit
constraint proxies. In order to see whether the e®ect of the crisis probability on stock price volatility is
due to either of these variables, we include them one at a time (columns (2) and (3)), and also together
(column (4)). In columns (2) and (4) the coe±cient on the credit rating is signi¯cant while the coe±cient
on the probability of the crisis is reduced, signi¯cantly. We therefore ¯nd that credit rating (our proxy for
the severity of credit constraints) indeed accounts for some, although not all, of the e®ect. The deposit
insurance, on the other hand, does not seem to have any e®ect. We temporarily conclude that the credit
constraints seem to be a more likely channel a®ecting the volatility of the stock market than government
guarantees.
The results of the dynamic panel regression (as in Arellano and Bond (1991)) are now reported in Table 8.
We can see that credit rating still enters signi¯cantly, however, including it no longer reduces the e®ect of the
predicted crisis probability. Interestingly, deposit insurance now enters signi¯cantly, when included by itself.
However its presence does not have an e®ect on the crisis probability coe±cient. Thus, we conclude that
while credit constraints and government guarantees do indeed a®ect the stock price volatility, as predicted
by the theory, these are not the only channels through which ¯nancial conditions and stock market volatility
are linked.
5 A Concluding Remark
The paper may have an interesting implication for the literature on the "equity premium" puzzle. To the
extent that institutional weaknesses raise the variance on stock returns, they may also contribute to the
11We do not ¯nd it necessary to lag other variables, since the dependent variable is measured for the end of the year
(December), while the rest of the variables are either °ows over the year or average for the year.
17spread between the mean return and the safe return on bonds. We conjecture that the introducing of
elements of risk aversion to the models on credit guarantees and credit constraints may explain part of the
equity puzzle and the variations of the equity puzzle across economies of di®erent institutional characteristics.
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21Table 1: Corporate Governance Indicators
country Law and order Creditor protection Shareholder rights
Argentina 5.4 1 4
Australia 10 1 4
Brazil 6.3 1 3
Canada 10 1 5
Chile 7.0 2 5
Denmark 10 3 2
Finland 10 1 3
France 9 0 3
Hong Kong 8.2 4 5
Italy 8 2 1
Japan 9 2 4
Korea 5 3 2
Malaysia 7 4 4
New Zealand 10 3 4
Singapore 9 4 4
Sweden 10 2 3
Switzerland 10 1 2
Thailand 6 3 2
United Kingdom 9 4 5
United States 10 1 5
Table 2: Stock market volatility and creditor rights
Coef. Std. Err. t
Law -0.23 0.02 -10.70
Creditor Protection -0.06 0.03 -1.82
Constant 3.95 0.20 20.11
R2 0.33
Observations 220
Dependent variable is private credit growth volatility
Time ¯xed e®ects are included
22Table 3: Private credit growth volatility
Coef. Std. Err. t
Creditor Protection -0.003 0.001 -3.01
Law -0.005 0.001 -7.11
Constant 0.101 0.007 14.56
Observations 200
R2 0.23
Dependent variable is private credit growth volatility
Time ¯xed e®ects are included
Table 4: Stock return volatility
Coef. Std. Err. t
Law -0.18 0.02 -7.3
Creditor Protection -0.03 0.03 -0.97
Volatility of Credit Growth (log) 0.73 0.12 6.02
Constant 5.60 0.33 17.01
R2 0.41
Observations 220
Dependent variable is stock return volatility
Time ¯xed e®ects are included
23Table 5: Countries and years of ¯nancial crises
country year Alt. de¯nition ¢ Real Interest rate
Argentina 1983 1 59.70617
Argentina 1984 0 5.532223
Argentina 1985 1 139.0005
Argentina 1989 1 42963.53
Argentina 1990 1 358475.8
Argentina 1992 1 29.09467
Argentina 1993 0 3.948962
Argentina 1994 1 7.228606
Argentina 2001 1 17.07706
Australia 1984 1 7.183205
Australia 1989 0 4.190388
Brazil 1982 1 10.75856
Brazil 1983 1 7.105807
Brazil 1988 0 6.53093
Brazil 1989 1 194.1218
Brazil 1990 1 608.8476
Brazil 1994 1 352.7721
Brazil 1998 1 7.15094
Brazil 2003 0 7.019809
Czech Republic 1997 0 4.689676
Czech Republic 1999 0 3.858152
Denmark 1982 0 3.474774
Denmark 1990 0 3.446622
Finland 1983 0 3.899578
Hong Kong 1998 0 3.779408
Hong Kong 1999 1 7.541826
Korea 1982 1 9.151735
Korea 1989 0 4.859002
Malaysia 1982 0 3.731038
Mexico 1984 1 12.51175
Mexico 1985 1 12.27889
Mexico 1989 1 43.93285
Mexico 1993 0 4.050268
Mexico 1995 1 10.32351
Mexico 1998 1 8.395061
New Zealand 1988 0 3.542305
Poland 1992 0 4.26256
Poland 1995 0 5.699811
Poland 1997 0 5.706461
Sweden 1992 1 13.51082
Switzerland 1983 0 3.00679
Thailand 1982 0 5.137234
Thailand 1984 0 4.482033
Thailand 1997 0 5.300499
24Table 6: Estimating probability of ¯nancial crisis
probit logit linear probit logit linear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shareholder rights -0.345*** -0.655** -0.012 -0.324*** -0.612*** -0.012
(0.125) (0.255) (0.010) (0.103) (0.211) (0.009)
Creditor Protection -0.216** -0.438** -0.019 -0.181* -0.363 -0.015
(0.099) (0.202) (0.011) (0.105) (0.224) (0.011)
Credit risk 0.084*** 0.166*** 0.010*** 0.105*** 0.206*** 0.011***
(0.018) (0.037) (0.003) (0.017) (0.036) (0.003)
Deposit insurance -0.808*** -1.645*** -0.057** -0.716** -1.454** -0.048*
(0.284) (0.621) (0.023) (0.312) (0.708) (0.025)
Change in real bank -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.000 -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.000*
credit to private sector (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Change in real bank 0.025*** 0.048*** 0.000** 0.024*** 0.045*** 0.000
reserves (0.007) (0.011) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.000)
US 3-year Treasury rate 0.120** 0.234** 0.010
(0.056) (0.105) (0.006)
Constant -0.173 -0.136 0.115** -1.416* -2.586 0.022
(0.574) (1.180) (0.051) (0.806) (1.612) (0.060)
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.05
McFadden's R2 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.22
Dependent variable is crisis indicator
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
25Table 7: Determinants of stock market volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pr(¯ncris2) 2.202*** 1.116** 2.608*** 1.041*
(0.569) (0.530) (0.603) (0.611)
Growth rate of GDP L1 -0.247 -0.303* -0.226 -0.308*
(0.185) (0.172) (0.184) (0.172)
Log of number of ¯rms listed -0.058** -0.048* -0.064** -0.047*
(0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025)
Credit rating 0.051*** 0.051***
(0.008) (0.009)
Explicit deposit insurance 0.104 -0.015
(0.071) (0.067)
Constant 1.986*** 1.767*** 1.936*** 1.773***
(0.183) (0.161) (0.189) (0.165)
Observations 273 273 273 273
Number of group(country) 19 19 19 19
AR(1) 0.40 0.33 0.40 0.32
Log likelihood -109.7 -100.3 -109.0 -100.3
Dependent variable is log of stock market volatility. Estimated by GLS.
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
26Table 8: Determinants of stock market volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock market volatility L1 0.198*** 0.141*** 0.173*** 0.141***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Stock market volatility L2 -0.040 -0.076 -0.060 -0.078
(0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Pr(¯ncris2) 3.477*** 3.642*** 4.746*** 4.121***
(0.726) (0.705) (0.823) (0.832)
Growth rate of GDP L1 -0.385** -0.221 -0.298 -0.212
(0.188) (0.186) (0.188) (0.186)
Log of number of ¯rms listed -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Credit rating 0.060*** 0.051***
(0.014) (0.017)
Explicit deposit insurance 0.347*** 0.138
(0.109) (0.126)
Constant 0.034 0.028 0.026 0.026
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 256 256 256 256
Number of group(country) 19 19 19 19
Sargan Â2 273.0 273.9 268.2 271.6
H0: no autocorrelation of 2nd order cannot reject cannot reject cannot reject cannot reject
Pr > z 0.15 0.41 0.25 0.43
Dependent variable is log of stock market volatility. Estimated by Arellano{Bond method.
Standard errors in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
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